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Week 2 reading



                   A history lesson (continued)

                   The viable birth of science
                   S    ince science suffered a stillbirth even in early medieval Arab civilization and since
                        it was a self-sustaining enterprise by the late seventeenth century, this implies that
                        its viable birth should be sought in a relatively brief period. The “received” view
                   has now been for the last three hundred years that science arose like a phoenix during the
                   Renaissance whose spokesmen rescued Greek science from a thousand-year-long neglect.
                   Jaki  argues  that  this  view  has  derived  “derived  partly  from  the  reformer’s  scorn  for
                   medieval  Catholicism  and  partly  from  the  hostility  of  the  leaders  of  the  French
                   Enlightenment to anything Christian.” Both groups had a vested interest in painting the
                   Catholic Middle Ages as dark as possible.
                     As a result neither the secularist nor the Protestant world of scholarship was ready to
                   take notice of the monumental studies of Pierre Duhem, beginning with his two-volume
                   Les origines de la statique (1905–1906) and continued with his three-volume Etudes sur
                   Léonard de Vinci (1906–1913). As Jaki shows in his magisterial studies on Duhem, those
                   two works had more than amply revealed the crucial debt owed by Copernicus and Galileo
                   (and indirectly by Newton) to some medieval scholars at the Sorbonne. Studied slighting of
                   those works anticipated a similar attitude towards the publication, in the 1950s, of the last
                   five volumes of Duhem’s ten-volume Le système du monde, possibly the greatest scholarly
                   feat by a single individual in modern times. This was the series which first showed the
                   medieval period not as a dark age for science but rather its very cradle. In fact, as Jaki
                   shows, the almost forty-year delay of the publication of Le système du monde is a proof of
                   that “scholarly” resistance to plain evidence. Jaki’s criticism does not spare, in that respect,
                   Catholic scholarship which has still to realize the crucial importance of Duhem’s heroic
                   efforts. For Jaki it is emphatically not “a freak happening of history that science was born
                   in a Europe that was living through its centuries of faith.”
                     The key point, according to  Jaki, is  that Jean Buridan  anchored his  impetus  theory
                   (which implies a beginning for any particular motion) in the beginning of all motion in
                   the first moment of creation. Buridan’s creative scientific thinking owed much to his keen
                   awareness of the solemn definition, at Lateran IV, of the age-old doctrine of creation out
                   of nothing  and  in  time. Also  most important  for Buridan  was the condemnation, on 7
                   March 1277, by Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, of 219  “Aristotelian” propositions,
                   some of which seemed to restrict the freedom of the Creator to create the universe solely
                   in its actual form. The overall aim was to “safeguard the abilities and exclusive rights of
                   the Creator against any compromise dictated by a narrow rationalism.” Bishop Tempier
                   outlawed  such  notions  as  the  perennial  recurrence  of  things  every  thirty-six  thousand
                   years, a view of the world as eternal, the view that the celestial orbs are like organs in a
                   human body, and the idea that stars determine individuals from the moment of their birth.
                   The decree showed that Christians were willing to distinguish, within the received Greek
                   corpus, what was contrary to a Christian belief in Creation from what could be accepted


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